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Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?:
Free Speech and the Precautionary
Principle
Frederick Schauer*
I. CAUSATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Many of the problems of free speech are problems of causation. More
specifically, the vast majority of events in which free speech concerns arise
are ones in which an issue is presented about the relationship between some
speech act and some consequence alleged to have been caused by that
speech act.' And it is very much the same when we think, not of individual
speech acts and individual consequences, but instead in terms of the causal
connection between classes of speech acts and classes of consequences.
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Visiting
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Essay was presented at the Pepperdine University Law
Review's Symposium on the First Amendment in the Modem Era, and was written while the author
was George Eastman Visiting Professor and Fellow of Balliol College, University of Oxford. A
subsequent version was presented at Ono Academic College, Tel Aviv, Israel, where the comments
and questions from the audience helped to sharpen the argument.
1. Free speech advocates often claim that governments and others seek to restrict speech with
which they "disagree," but that is almost certainly false. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Off-Campus
Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. Scl.
& TECH. L. 243, 253 (2001); Nadine L. Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to
Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 Case WES. RES. L. REV. 449, 454 (1996).
Those who would restrict speech with which they allegedly disagree typically maintain that the
speech at issue is the cause of some consequence they believe undesirable. Sometimes the
consequence is uncontroversial, but the question of cause is contested-as with claims that speech
will be the cause of terrorism or sexual violence-and sometimes what some think of as a harmful
consequence is seen by others as not, as with claims that some speech causes an increase in sexual
promiscuity or disrespect for the President. But regardless of the extent and type of disagreement,
however, in almost all cases the proponent of a restriction is claiming not that she (merely) disagrees
with the speech, but that the speech will be the cause of an unfortunate consequence. We can then
debate the extent to which the consequence is actually bad, or we can debate the extent to which the
speech at issue will increase its likelihood, or we can debate whether even an increase in the
likelihood would justify restricting the speech, but we make little progress when we, usually
inaccurately, attribute to those who would restrict a desire to restrict simply because of that
disagreement.
That free speech scenarios involve causal relationships is not necessarily
to say that identifying the causal relationship-or even the degree of
causation-is always, or even usually, a difficult question. In the typical
scenario involving offensive speech, for example, there is rarely an issue
about whether the utterance involved has caused offense. Thus in Virginia
v. Black,2 there was little doubt as to whether burning a cross adjacent to the
home of an African-American caused both offense and fear. Instead, the
important question was whether the speech-caused offense and fear could
constitutionally permit legal intervention. 3  Similarly, in many defamation
and invasion of privacy situations, the questions of whether privacy has been
invaded or reputation damaged are decidedly subservient to broader policy
questions about just which forms of reputation damage and privacy invasion
may be punished or sanctioned consistent with the demands of the First
Amendment.
In other circumstances, however, the causation question is at the
forefront of free speech controversies. Will advocacy of terrorism increase
the likelihood of terrorist acts? Will publication of instructions for making
bombs 4 or committing murders for hire' (probabilistically) 6 cause such acts
to occur, in the sense of increasing the chances that such acts will take
place? Will endorsing or glorifying sexual violence have an effect on the
incidence of sexual violence?7 Will advocating resistance to the draft or
overthrow of the government produce more draft resistance or more attempts
to overthrow the government than would otherwise have been the case?
8
2. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
3. See Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of
Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197.
4. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), mandamus denied
sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979).
5. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
6. Typically, the law raises two varieties of causation questions. In one, an act has already
occurred, and the question is: whom, if anyone, should be held legally responsible for causing that
act? This is ordinarily the way in which causation questions arise in tort and criminal law, and such
questions have generated a rich body of literature. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt,
CAUSATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1963); Guido Calabresi, Some Thought on Risk Distribution and the Law of Tort, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961). By contrast, in other circumstances the legal issue is about which acts should be prohibited
or deterred, in the belief that those acts are the causes of other acts, and in such circumstances the
somewhat different idea of probabilistic causation is at the forefront. Then the question is not
whether we can predict with certainty that some future act will occur-for the answer to that
question is almost always "no." Rather, the question is whether some alleged cause-smoking
cigarettes, for example-raises the probability of some consequence or effect-contracting lung
cancer, for example-by a sufficient degree to justify legal intervention against the cause.
7. See Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 737 (1987).
8. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
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Will advertisements for gambling,9 cigarettes, 0 or alcohol"' increase the
frequency of such activities? In all of these instances, and many others,
issues of causation are highly relevant, and First Amendment doctrine has
been shaped, and will continue to be shaped, by the answers that courts,
legislatures, and commentators give to such questions of causation.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
As with many legal questions about causation generally, most of the
questions of causation surrounding the First Amendment arise under
conditions of considerable empirical uncertainty. We have little idea, for
example, about whether a charismatic speaker (or a well-designed website)
who urges a repeat of the incidents of September 11, 2001, will increase the
likelihood that such incidents will occur again, and if so, by how much. We
do not know whether Clarence Brandenburg's calls for "revengeance"
against African-Americans and Jews 12 increased the probability of such acts
occurring. In his iconic dissent in Abrams v. United States, 3 Holmes was
confident that advocacy of draft resistance by the impoverished and socially
marginal immigrant whom he described as a "puny anonymit[y]"' 14 would do
little to cause an increase in draft resistance,15 but things may not have been
so clear a half-century later when the educated and articulate household
name of Benjamin Spock urged pretty much the same thing.' 6  The
advertising industry appears committed to the premise that advertising for
cigarettes and alcohol will increase consumption, but the extent of such an
increase is not so clear; nor is it clear whether advertising produces a net
increase in consumption, or if instead, as the cigarette companies insist,
advertising simply facilitates consumer shifting from one brand to another.' 7
These examples are hardly unique, and much of First Amendment argument
and decision-making takes place under conditions in which crucial questions
9. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
10. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
11. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
12. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-47 (1969) (per curiam).
13. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. ld. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1987).
16. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
17. See, e.g., ROGER BRADBURN, UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS ETHICS 73 (2001); Roscoe B.
Starek, IIl, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address Before the Am. Bar Ass'n: Advertising, Alcohol,
and the First Amendment (Aug. 4, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/aba97web.shtm.
of causality cannot be answered with anything approaching strong
confidence.
When we understand First Amendment theory and doctrine as an
exercise in determining causation under conditions of uncertainty, we can
see a parallel between many free speech questions and what is commonly
referred to as the "precautionary principle."'" Especially in Europe,' 9 but
increasingly elsewhere, issues involving the environment, genetically
modified foods, space exploration, nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and
many others are analyzed through the lens of a principle that tells decision-
makers to resolve causal uncertainty in a risk-averse or cautious way.20 That
is, even if we are highly unsure of the consequences of, say, genetically
modified foods, it is better under conditions of uncertainty to restrict the
production and sale of such foods because of the speculative-but possibly
catastrophic-effects of their proliferation. 21 "It is better to be safe than
sorry," the venerable maxim goes; a maxim that grounds a principle of
conservatism in the face of causal uncertainty when we are unsure of the
likelihood of various consequences-consequences that, should they occur,
would almost certainly be dire.
From one perspective, much of American free speech doctrine can be
seen as a rejection of the precautionary principle. Under conditions of
uncertainty with respect to the potential consequences of speech, it is a
mistake, longstanding doctrine maintains, to err on the side of caution.22
18. See generally ARIE THOUWBORST, THE EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494 (2008); Leslie Wexler, Limiting the
Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 459 (2006).
19. See Gary E. Marchant & Kenneth L. Mossman, Please Be Careful: The Spread of Europe's
Precautionary Principle Could Wreak Havoc on Economies, Public Health, and Plain Old Common
Sense, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005
20. See, e.g., JANE HOLDER & MARIA LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, LAW, AND POLICY
15-34 (2d ed. 2007).
21. See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman, European Community Legislation for Traceability and
Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 32, 35-36 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007),
22. The common criticism of the precautionary principle objects that the principle ignores even
the most elementary conception of expected value. See, e.g., INDUR M. GOKANY, THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 9-10
(2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005);
AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? (1995); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the
Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996). Some argue that our existing
decision-theoretic tools can account for the way in which we should worry more about high-danger,
low-probability events, rather than about low-danger events with the same probability of occurrence.
To impose a precautionary overlay on a rational calculation of expected costs or expected dangers,
they insist, is scarcely rational. One rejoinder would maintain that whatever values one inserts into
an expected value calculation cannot fully capture the degree of harm that certain environmental and
related disasters would bring, and that the precautionary principle is one way of compensating for
304
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Those who urge terrorist acts, or provide instructions or recipes for their
commission, may possibly produce catastrophic effects, but the First
Amendment, so the doctrine concludes, demands that we take the risk. To
put essentially the same point differently, the First Amendment tradition
demands that the risk of speech-caused negative consequences be borne by
the entire citizenry, rather than being imposed on the speaker. 23 It is
dangerous to free speech values, it is said and so the doctrine says, to prefer
being safe to being sorry; thus the doctrine commands that here, unlike
elsewhere, it is better to be sorry than safe.
As should be obvious, whether we place more importance on being safe
rather than sorry-or instead, on protecting a right to free speech that might
result in our being sorry rather than safe-depends on what we take to be the
catastrophic occurrence.2 4 The idea of the precautionary principle is that,
having identified the possibility of a catastrophic occurrence-whether it be
nuclear disaster, environmental upheaval, or the loss of many important
species-under conditions of uncertainty, we should err on the side of
eliminating those conditions that might possibly produce the catastrophe.
Similarly, if in the free speech context we define the catastrophe as the
overthrow of the government or a major terrorist attack, a commensurate
precautionary principle would demand that we vigilantly restrict speech in
the service of guarding against the catastrophe. Actual free speech doctrine,
however, demands just the reverse. It requires us to accept the uncertain risk
of a catastrophe rather than restrict the speech that might cause it. But if we
were to define the catastrophe as the large-scale restriction of speech, 25 then
we could understand existing free speech doctrine, not as a rejection of the
precautionary principle, but instead as an embodiment of the precautionary
principle-albeit with a different conception of the catastrophe against
which it is necessary, at almost all costs, to take precautions.
this potential under-valuation of certain low-probability catastrophic consequences. Applying the
same rejoinder in reverse explains why Learned Hand's "gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability" version of an expected value calculation in the free speech context, in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is frequently taken to have
ignored or underestimated the free speech values involved.
23. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
24. 1 am grateful for Eyal Benvenisti for very helpful comments and conversation on this point.
25. The ubiquity of "slippery slope" rhetoric in the free speech context is consistent with the
view that when it comes to free speech, many people think that we need a precautionary principle
with respect to excess restriction of speech, rather than a precautionary principle with respect to the
consequences that speech may cause. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361
(1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
However, we normally think of disasters in terms of physical damage
and not the impairment of individual rights, and thus it seems more natural
to think of taking precautions against a terrorist attack, unlawful revolution,
environmental catastrophe, or genetic disaster rather than precautions against
restrictions of free speech rights. And that is why it may be better to think of
the First Amendment doctrine as rejecting the precautionary principle rather
than just embodying a different one;2 6 but this is only a matter of form and
not of substance. The logical structure of the precautionary principle is
indeed a reversible one, and one person's riskiness is another's
conservatism, depending on what each values most. To call the First
Amendment a precautionary principle of a different stripe is thus not to
make an error. Nevertheless, to think of the First Amendment in terms of a
rejection of the precautionary principle may better capture the way in which
the First Amendment--or at least longstanding First Amendment doctrine-
demands that we accept risks of speech-caused catastrophes that, if speech
were not involved, we would consider sufficiently important to guard
against.
III. THE EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE
Although rarely framed in terms of the precautionary principle, the issue
just discussed is hardly a new one. Holmes relied heavily on causal
impotence in Abrams, 27 and Learned Hand's expected value calculation in
Dennis, 28 with its famous attention to low probability but high danger
consequences, can be understood as suggesting that sometimes it is better to
be safe than sorry. The question then arises, however, as to whether the
26. Consider, for example, the original "clear and present danger" formula in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). By requiring that dangers be clear and present, rather than speculative
and distant, in order to be regulated consistently with the First Amendment, even the original
articulation of this central free speech idea can be understood as another manifestation of the idea
that the First Amendment demands that we be willing to be sorry rather than safe. The same idea,
but in an even more extreme version, undergirds the modem understanding of clear and present
danger in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). By insisting that potentially
danger-causing speech not be restricted unless the danger is likely, the danger truly grave, the
advocacy explicit, and the temporal connection imminent, Brandenburg demands that we accept that
causal speech whose serious causal consequences are, for example, likely but temporally remote,
immediate but unlikely, and perhaps most seriously, both likely and non-remote, but produced by
something other than speech explicitly urging the consequences. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 374-75 (1927) (requiring danger to be likely and truly grave to be restricted); Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105 (1973) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (requiring advocacy to be explicit and the temporal
connection to be imminent in order to justify restriction); see generally Larry Alexander, Intent and
Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 101, 118
(Francine Hazan & David Kretzmer eds., 2000); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), afid, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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(almost but not quite complete) rejection of the Dennis approach in modem
doctrine is consistent with what we know about the world in which the
Internet dominates, in which September 11 is a reality, and in which
instructions for, rather than just advocacy of, catastrophic acts are an
omnipresent reality. 29 Perhaps the answer is yes, and perhaps there are good
normative reasons for adhering to the existing approach. But given that
Brandenburg has never been applied by the Supreme Court to facts and
instructions 30 rather than pure advocacy, 31 and given that the case has never
been applied by the Supreme Court to tort actions rather than criminal
prosecution, there are good empirical and doctrinal reasons to think carefully
about the issue. That is not to say that the existing approach ought to be
modified. But the precautionary principle, and its contrast with uniquely
American free speech doctrine, may provide a useful way of examining the
issues in a careful and analytically rigorous way.
Like Schenck and like Dennis3 before it, therefore, Brandenburg can be
understood to be premised on a view about which consequences are in fact
likely, about what the causal relationship between speech and such
consequences is likely to be, and about just what the dangers of those
consequences really are. Legal doctrine is created in light of empirical
estimates about the state of the world,33 and as new events cause us to revise
our previous estimates, it should come as little surprise that these new events
should cause us to re-examine-which is not necessarily to change-the
doctrines that have emanated out of earlier and possibly outdated empirical
estimates.
29. Because most free speech commentators are sympathetic to the uniquely protective American
approach to freedom of speech, it is not surprising that the literature shows little sympathy for
modifying free speech doctrine in light of recent events. See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004);
Laura K. Donahue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233
(2005); but see Liezl Irene Pangilinan, "When a Nation is at War": A Context Dependent Theory for
the Regulation of Weapons Recipes, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683 (2004).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Butorff, 572
F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
31. See generally Kent Greenawalt, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989); Marc
Rohr, Grand Illusion: The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encourages or Facilitates Criminal
Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1095 (2005); Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1973 (2005).
32. See William Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background
of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375.
33. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
In engaging in such re-examination, however, it may be important not to
take either the acceptance or the rejection of the precautionary principle as
an end point. Rather, bringing the well-known precautionary principle into
First Amendment analysis is just a way of reminding us that many First
Amendment problems involve assessing speech-produced causation under
conditions of uncertainty, and that addressing that issue is not simply a
matter of accepting or rejecting the precautionary principle, but rather of
considering many First Amendment issues as being, at bottom, questions of
decision theory. It is to this that I now turn.
IV. FREE SPEECH, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, AND THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH
In thinking about the First Amendment as a question of decision theory,
it is useful to recognize that the issues presented by the precautionary
principle, and the framing of free speech questions in precautionary principle
terms, have particular relevance in the context of an understanding of
freedom of speech that sees its greatest value in its ability to foster the
search for truth-the oldest and most enduring of the theoretical
justifications for freedom of speech.3 4  From John Milton's 1644
Areopagitica35 to the modem era, advocates of freedom of speech have
maintained that an official policy of allowing the expression of the widest
possible range of facts, opinions, and ideas is crucial to the acquisition of
new knowledge and to the ability for a society to locate, and thus to reject
those parts of the received wisdom that are in actuality false.36 Free speech,
so it is said, is a necessary condition for the search for truth.37
Although this argument from truth has a distinguished provenance and
endures as a civil libertarian slogan, it has not fared nearly as well in the
theoretical literature. 38 The phenomenon of persistent falsehood-astrology
is the frivolous example; the authenticity of the Protocols of the Elders of
Zion,3 9 a far more serious one--demonstrates, so the critics say, that a
34. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 18-34 (1982).
35. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
36. See, e.g., Carl Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956); Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free
Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First
Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 161 (1972); William P. Marshall, In Defense of
the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
37. See Steven D. Smith, Skepticsm, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 703 (1987).
38. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 34; Alvin 1. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and
the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of ldeas: A
Legitimating Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
39. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is a tract, most likely concocted by the Czarist secret
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regime of freedom of expression does not necessarily lead to the discovery
of truth,40 and may at times even impede it. And as a result of such skeptical
conclusions about the ability of truth to emerge and about the capacity of
falsehood to be exposed, even under strong free speech conditions, various
other arguments-for example the relationship between free speech and the
mechanisms of democracy,41 the importance of deliberation in fostering
equality and self-governance,42 the link between autonomy and the value of
unrestricted access to ideas and opinions, 43 and the centrality of self-
expression to personal identity44-have all ascended in importance as the
number of adherents to the argument from truth has dwindled.
Yet although the argument from truth has diminished in relative
importance in the theoretical literature, its public and rhetorical prominence
persists. 45  Moreover, the argument from truth still provides the basis for
police, describing a fabricated account of a Jewish plot to take over the world. It has since been
proven to be a hoax. See Michael J. Polelle, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-
Friendly Proposal, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213, 219 (2003); STEVEN L. JACOBS & MARK
WEITZMAN, DISMANTLING THE BIG LIE: THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION (2003).
40. A more plausible version of the argument from truth would not make such stringent demands
on speech's epistemological reliability. It would recognize that sound ideas do not always prevail in
the marketplace of ideas, and that unsound ideas are often accepted despite their unsoundness. But it
would maintain that freedom of speech is epistemologically valuable, precisely because the truth of a
proposition is a reliable-even if imperfect-predictor of the likelihood that a proposition will be
accepted. Whether this is in fact so, however, is an empirical claim subject to testing, and should
hardly be taken as axiomatic.
41. E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245; ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT (1995); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Robert C. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353 (2000); Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen,
Understanding Post's and Meiklejohn's Mistakes: The Central Role ofAdversary Democracy in the
Theory of Free Expression, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 08-26 (2008),
http://ssm.com/abstact= 177788.
42. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995).
43. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334 (1991).
44. E.g., Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.R. 712 (Can.); C. Edwin Baker, Scope
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974 (1978); Sheldon Nahmod,
The GFP (Green) Bunny: Reflections on the Intersection of Art, Science, and the First Amendment,
34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 473, 475 n.l 1 (2001); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
45. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7-13 (1985); Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes
Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (1997); Guy E.
Carmi, Dignity--The Enemy From Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human
Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957 (2007); Kent Greenawalt, Free
Speech Justification, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 132-33 (1989); Matthew Lynch, Closing the
309
much of the modem discussion-both theoretical and public-of academic
freedom and freedom of scientific research,46 for here again we see recurring
arguments that the importance of allowing free communication and
unrestricted inquiry lies in the way in which the lack of restrictions will
foster the search for truth and the increase in human knowledge. The
argument from truth, with its provenance in Milton, in John Stuart Mill's On
Liberty,47 and in the judicial opinions of American judges like Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Learned Hand,48 and Felix Frankfurter,49 may have
receded from the forefront of free speech discourse, but it is very far from
having disappeared. And as a consequence of the continuing importance of
the argument from truth, it may still be worthwhile to examine the argument,
and to examine it in a way that attempts to transcend many of the slogans
with which it is traditionally attached.
We associate the argument from truth with literary figures such as John
Milton, with philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper,5° and
with jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes 5' and Learned Hand, but at the
heart of the argument is a claim that is far less literary, philosophical, or
legal than it is empirical. The claim that freedom of speech will lead to
increased knowledge necessarily presupposes the claim that true
propositions are more likely to be accepted than false ones; or to put it more
precisely, that the truth of a true proposition has considerable explanatory
power in determining whether, for some audience, and in some context, that
proposition will be accepted or rejected.
When phrased in this way, it becomes clear that the most realistic form
of the argument from truth is one that recognizes its inherently uncertain and
probabilistic character. It is of course true that some false propositions are
accepted by the population, or by some subset of it, and in some contexts,
despite their falsity. But even a plausible version of the argument from truth
would not, and could not, deny this. Rather, it would maintain that, although
Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and the Potential for a First
Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 234, 301-02 (2007); L.A. Powe, Jr., Situating Schauer,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005); Paul
Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007); John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government,
the Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988); James Weinstein,
Institutional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 493 (2007).
47. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003).
48. In addition to Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), see International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950).
49. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 546-53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. See KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966).
51. In addition to Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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some false propositions are accepted despite their falsity, and some true
propositions are rejected despite their truth, it is nevertheless the case that
true propositions, just because of their truth, are more likely in numerous
domains to be accepted than false ones.
Yet this is hardly self-evident. If we think of truth (or falsity) as one
attribute of an articulated proposition, we can see that other attributes would
include, for example: the identity of the speaker, the various persuasive or
charismatic qualities of the speaker, the consistency of the proposition with
propositions already accepted by the audience, the general biases and
prejudices and attitudes of the audience, the frequency with which the
proposition is asserted, the style or manner in which the proposition is
asserted, and many more. At the heart of the argument from truth is the
claim not that none of these factors will make much difference in
determining which propositions will be accepted, and that even in the face of
such phenomena-recognizing that each factor has some explanatory power
over which propositions will be accepted or rejected-the truth of a
proposition nonetheless has considerable power in explaining why some
propositions are accepted and others rejected.
When put in this way, the empirical core of the argument is exposed.
That does not make the argument any more or less sound, but it does call
into question the basis for the traditional arguments. In Areopagitica, Milton
asked rhetorically, "Let [Truth] and Falshood [sic] grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the wors, [sic] in a free and open encounter.,1 2 But Milton's
eloquence in posing the question hardly entails the conclusion that he would
have been among the people most qualified to answer it. Indeed, and
perhaps more controversially, we might say much the same about John
Stuart Mill's claim in On Liberty that articulated challenges to received
opinion will often, if true and allowed to be circulated, lead to the
acceptance of the challenge and the rejection of the previously received
opinion.53 So too with Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous claim that "the best
test of truth is the power of [an idea] to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market., 54 All of these claims may well be true, but to find out if that
is the case we might be better off consulting the marketing experts rather
than the philosophers and the lawyers.
52. MILTON, supra note 35, at 35.
53. See MILL, supra note 47.
54. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
V. TOWARDS A DECISION THEORY OF FREE SPEECH
This is not the occasion on which actually to test the empirical claims I
have just sketched, but appreciating the empirical nature of the argument
enables us to examine the normative free speech claim with considerably
greater precision. Implicit in the foregoing is the view that for some
members of the population-the public at large, politicians, scientists, etc.-
communicating a proposition now thought to be false (for example, that the
Holocaust did not happen, that AIDS was intentionally introduced into the
population by the American government, or that wearing special diet
slippers or diet earrings will help people lose weight)55 will increase the
acceptance of that proposition if that proposition turns out to be true. And
this is, of course, the conventional freedom of expression wisdom, from
Milton to Mill to Holmes to the present. What is less conventional,
however, is the likelihood that communicating a proposition now thought to
be false will increase the acceptance of that proposition by some members of
the population even if the proposition is actually false. When we allow
people to say that diet slippers help with weight loss, there is a risk that such
communications will increase the number of people who believe that
proposition, and that the falsity of the proposition, even if it has some
explanatory power, will be an imperfect guarantor of its non-acceptance.
The acceptance of false propositions, of course, is a problem only if
some harm ensues from it. It may well be that the harms coming from the
strangely truth-resistant belief in astrology are small, but it would be hard to
say the same thing about the harms coming from acceptance of the belief
that garlic rubs are a more effective treatment than anti-retroviral drugs for
HIV-AIDS, or that gay men are on average less physically courageous than
their heterosexual counterparts. Still, not all false beliefs are harmful, and
not all of the harmful false beliefs are equally harmful. So the next step in
the analysis would be to say that what is at issue is not simply the question
of harm, but rather the question of the expected benefit flowing from
acceptance of some belief now thought to be false if it turns out to be true,
compared to the expected harm flowing from the increased acceptance of
some belief now thought to be false if in fact that belief is in fact false.
The same analysis can be reformulated in terms of the statistician's
familiar distinction between Type I and Type II errors. If we label as the
55. See, e.g., DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
TRUTH AND MEMORY (1994); ALAN CANTWELL, JR., AIDS AND THE DOCTORS OF DEATH: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1995); FED. TRADE COMM'N, DECEPTION IN
WEIGHT LOSS ADVERTISING: A WORKSHOP 8 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/weightloss/
transcripts/transcript-full.pdf ("We're talking about screening out the most egregious examples [of
fraudulent marketing]. Weight loss earrings or shoe insoles, pills that tell consumers they can eat
whatever they want and still lose weight, and products that make physically implausible claims like
lose 30 pounds in 30 days.").
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Type I error the non-acceptance of a true belief (and this is of course what
most concerned Milton, Mill, and their successors), 56 and if we label as the
Type II error the increased acceptance of a false belief, then the normative or
institutional design task is one of weighing the expected costs (or harms) of
the Type I error against the expected costs or harms of the Type II error. Yet
although this way of putting the issue may now seem obvious, it was not so
obvious to Mill, who implicitly appears to have taken the position that the
avoidance of Type I errors is overwhelmingly more important than the
avoidance of Type II errors, such that it would be worthwhile to endure a
substantial increase in acceptance of false propositions in order to avoid
even the slightest possibility of missing (non-acceptance) a currently
unknown truth. 
57
Mill's implicit calculus may well have been correct, although it is hard
to imagine that it would be equally correct for all propositions or for all
types of propositions, and for all populations in all contexts. But Mill's
hidden presupposition does prompt us to make the calculus even more
sophisticated by recognizing three additional features. First, the value of
knowledge may in fact be less than infinite. Truth is important, and
knowledge arguably more so, but there is scant reason to believe that even
the smallest bit of increased knowledge is worth an infinite cost. That truth
is valuable hardly seems controversial. That the value of truth is lexically
prior to all other values seems considerably less obvious, as is the related
idea that truth is not only valuable, but priceless.5 8
Second, it is hardly the case that truth is itself without costs. Truthful
invasions of privacy may be among the more common examples, but there
are many others. Anyone who has commented honestly on another's
appearance or habits has discovered the venerable maxim that "the truth
hurts." More importantly, perhaps, is that as science enables us to learn
more and more about ethnic, racial, gender, and other differences among
people, and about the extent to which, if at all, such differences have a
genetic component as well as a cultural one, we ignore at our peril the
possibility that science may at some point offer us truths whose widespread
acceptance will be severely detrimental to values of equality, democracy,
dignity, respect, community, and even public order.
56. See discussion supra Part IV.
57. See MILL, supra note 47.
58. See Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699
(1991).
Third, as Mill most notably insisted, even falsity has its value.5 9 For
Mill, this was the value in fostering a better understanding of propositions
that are in fact true, and at times also enabling us to enrich our true
propositions by incorporating within them the truths in propositions which
are largely false, but it does not take very much imagination to think of
various other ways in which acceptance of falsity may have some less
obvious benefits accompanying its obvious costs. One, for example, might
be the way in which falsity tells us something about its utterer, a
phenomenon quite widespread in modem politics. And another might be the
way in which false propositions play a valuable role in literature.
These three factors are more than merely interesting complications.
They are factors that a fuller decision theory of truth discovery and error
identification would incorporate. Such an analysis would thus take into
account all of the possible costs and benefits of locating a previously
undiscovered truth, and might even recognize that these costs and benefits
would be different for different sub-populations of some larger population.
This analysis would thus, in theory, allow a determination of the expected
cost of failing to locate a new truth and the expected cost of increasing the
circulation of a proposition now believed to be false. Moreover, such an
approach-as a structure for analysis but not as a formula into which
numerical variables might be inserted-would enable us with respect to
particular propositions, or for the aggregate of propositions of some type, to
determine whether the game was worth the candle.
VI. CONCLUSION: SIMPLY A BEGINNING
The foregoing merely scratches the surface of what a full-scale decision-
theoretic approach to freedom of speech would contain. For example, the
model would have to be expanded to take into account the obvious problem
of institutional empowerment. For although it would in theory be possible
to make such calculations on a decision by decision, or even proposition by
proposition basis, in reality the decision is one of institutional design, in
which we are asking less about whether a particular decision to suppress is
wise, taking into account all of the above under conditions of uncertainty
about the truth or falsity of the suppressed proposition, but about the
aggregate consequences of a suppression (or non-suppression) rule, and
about the aggregate consequences of suppression and non-suppression
institutions.
For these purposes, however, it is not so important that we list all of the
possible consequences. What is important is that we recognize both that
many seemingly false propositions really are false, and also that the
59. See MILL, supra note 47.
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circulation of false propositions (and some true ones) is not without cost.
Once we take these seemingly non-controversial propositions on board, as
much of the (especially American) free speech culture often does not, the
path towards a more systematic and decision-theoretic analysis of central
issues in the theory and practice of freedom of expression may become
substantially easier to follow.
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